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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his opening brief, Mr. Clyde argued the district court erred in relying upon
certain statements contained in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) and GAINI Recommendation and Referral Summary (“G-RRS”).

Mr. Clyde also argued the

district court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to an aggregate unified term of
17 years, with 14 years fixed, for burglary and possession of a controlled substance.
The State argues in response that the district court did not commit fundamental error in
failing to strike certain statements from the PSI and did not abuse its discretion at
sentencing. To be clear, Mr. Clyde does not contend the district court erred in failing to
strike certain statements from the PSI. His claim of error is not that the PSI and the GRRS contain his statements, but that the district court erred in relying on those
statements. Counsel for Mr. Clyde made this argument at sentencing and it has thus
been preserved for consideration by this Court. The district court abused its discretion
and Mr. Clyde’s sentences must be reduced either by this Court or by the district court
on remand.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Clyde set forth a complete statement of facts and course of proceedings in
his opening brief. Mr. Clyde includes this section to respond to two statements made by
the State in its brief. First, the State acknowledges in its brief that Mr. Clyde “did assert
through counsel that his claims that he killed three men in a gang-related shooting and
stabbing were not true but were instead an attempt to appear important.”

(Resp.

Br., p.7.) The State is correct that Mr. Clyde’s counsel explained to the district court that
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Mr. Clyde claimed to have killed three people “to make himself look tougher and bigger”
and it “was never anything that happened.” (Tr., p.22, Ls.22-24.) It is important to note,
however, that Mr. Clyde also told the district court that he “never killed anybody” and
explained to the court why he claimed to have done so. (Tr., p.32, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Clyde
said, “I’m 19 years old and I’m going to a drug house or trying to sell drugs or whatever,
people look at me like I’m just a youngster, you know. And in my head that’s what I
needed to do to prove to people that I was a big guy . . . .” (Tr., p.26, L.23 – p.27, L.2.)
Second, the State asserts in its brief that “[a]lthough [Mr.] Clyde was given the
opportunity to participate in drug court in relation to his methamphetamine conviction, it
is an understatement to say he did poorly.” (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) This is incorrect.
Mr. Clyde was not given the opportunity to participate in drug court; he was given the
opportunity to apply to participate in drug court. The PSI states, “On 8/20/15 during
court it was determined that [Mr. Clyde] does not qualify for the drug court program due
to the Residential Treatment Recommendation [in the G-RRS].” (Conf. Exs., p.7.) And
counsel for Mr. Clyde informed the district court at sentencing that Mr. Clyde was not
accepted to drug court because his LSI score was too high and because he was
assessed as needing inpatient treatment. (Tr., p.21, Ls.8-11.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it relied at sentencing upon unreliable and
unsupported statements contained in the PSI and the G-RRS?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Clyde an
aggregate unified sentence of 17 years, with 14 years fixed, in light of the
mitigating factors that exist in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Relied At Sentencing On Unreliable And Unsupported
Statements Contained In The PSI And The G-RRS
The standard of review here is not fundamental error.1

Mr. Clyde does not

contend the district court erred by failing to strike from the PSI and the G-RRS
statements he made during the presentence investigation supposedly admitting he
committed three murders. Mr. Clyde did not move to strike these statements in the
district court and any such motion would likely have been denied, as he does not
dispute that he made the statements. Mr. Clyde’s argument on appeal is of a different
nature. He contends the district court erred in relying on his statements for their truth in
fashioning his sentence because there was no reliable evidence that Mr. Clyde
committed murder. The State does not respond to this argument—perhaps because
the error is so clear. There was and is no reliable evidence that Mr. Clyde committed
three murders. The district court sentenced Mr. Clyde based largely on these supposed
murders and the sentences it imposed must be vacated.
Mr. Clyde’s juvenile records, which were attached as an exhibit to the PSI, reflect
that Mr. Clyde was convicted as a juvenile for providing false information and for
fraudulent use of a financial transaction card. (Conf. Exs., pp.6, 27.) This is consistent

While Mr. Clyde is not required to show fundamental error, he notes that the district
court’s error arguably violated his constitutional right to due process. See State v.
Martin, 142 Idaho 58, 60 (Ct. App. 2005) (“[I]t is a deprivation of due process for a
sentencing court to rely upon information that is materially untrue or to make materially
false assumptions of fact.”); State v. Gawron, 124 Idaho 625, 627 (Ct. App. 1993) (“A
defendant is denied due process when the sentencing judge relies upon information that
is materially untrue or when a judge makes materially false assumptions of fact.”).
1
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with what Mr. Clyde told the district court—that he went to a juvenile facility because he
used his uncle’s credit card.

(Tr., p.28, Ls.10-12.)

The district court could have

considered Mr. Clyde’s actual juvenile record in fashioning his sentence, but that is not
what the district court did. The district court sentenced Mr. Clyde based predominately
on his statements that he committed three murders. The State appears to acknowledge
this fact. In its brief, the State quotes the district court’s statement that it imposed a
sentence that was “pretty much what I’d sentence you to if I assume those [three
murders] happened.” (Resp. Br., p.3 (quoting Tr. p. 36, Ls.7-22.)) That is exactly what
the district court did—assumed in the absence of any reliable evidence that those three
murders happened. This was preserved error that this Court can correct on appeal.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Clyde, An
Aggregate Unified Sentence Of 17 Years, With 14 Years Fixed, In Light Of The
Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case
This is a compelling case. Mr. Clyde was 19 years old when he committed the
offenses at issue, which were his first felony convictions. (Conf. Exs., pp.2, 6-7.) If the
aggregate sentence is allowed to stand, Mr. Clyde will not be eligible for parole until he
is 33 years old. The State contends that “[w]hat weight the district court gave the
evidence was entirely within its own discretion.” (Resp. Br., p.8.) But that is not entirely
true. As the Court of Appeals recognized in State v. Justice, “[s]entence reviews have
long been conducted by the Idaho appellate courts. It is a responsibility with which we
are charged.” 152 Idaho 48, 54 (Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). In reviewing a
sentence, this Court must consider “the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest.” Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho
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382, 384 (1978) (additional citations omitted)). Under any reasonable view of the facts,
these factors do not warrant the aggregate sentence imposed.
Mr. Clyde returned items to Wal-Mart that he did not purchase, and was a
passenger in a vehicle containing methamphetamine. (Tr., p.10, Ls.3-14, p.12, Ls.1214.) That is all. The district court acknowledged that the nature of the offenses did not
warrant the sentence imposed—the court stated, “And I also understand that just the
nature of the offenses themselves don’t automatically call for a sentence that long . . . .”
(Tr., p.39, Ls.19-21.) The sentence was also not warranted by Mr. Clyde’s character
and was not necessary to protect the public interest. The sentence was, in a word,
excessive.
The State contends, among other things, that the district court did not abuse its
discretion at sentencing because it “specifically expressed a willingness to reconsider
[the] evidence during the course of the retained jurisdiction.” (Resp. Br., p.11.) The fact
that a court may potentially correct its error is not an adequate remedy for the error.
This is especially true here because the district court is not required to conduct a
hearing before deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction. See State v. Goodlett, 139
Idaho 262, 264 (Ct. App. 2003); see also I.C. § 19-2601(4). This Court is charged with
reducing sentences that are excessive. The aggregate sentence imposed on Mr. Clyde
was excessive and must be reduced.

6

CONCLUSION
Mr. Clyde respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed and indeterminate
portions of his sentences and place him on probation. Alternatively, he requests that
this Court remand these cases to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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